The University of Toledo

Kidney Transplant Program (OHCO) Site Visit

30 August 2012

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On 10 August 2012 near the end of a live-donor nephrectomy at The University of Toledo Medical Center the live-donor kidney, which had been located in a basin in the sterile ice machine of the donor operating room was unintentionally discarded by one of the circulating nurses assigned to the case.

The details of the event are consistently explained by various team members: upon returning from lunch, the circulating nurse for the case began breaking down the "back table" without asking the surgeon/surgical team for clearance. She began by clearing the ice machine which contained the kidney. She inverted the sterile clear plastic drape sheet containing ice, kidney, sterile basin, and surgical sponge. She noted the presence of the basin and removed it from the bag, then took the ice kidney and sponge to the 'hopper', the toilet-like waste-disposal apparatus in the operating suites where liquid waste is flushed into the hospital waste-collecting system. With the contents of the drape in the hopper but not yet flushed, she noted the presence of the sponge and retrieved it, but did not notice that the residual ice contained the kidney, and flushed both ice and kidney. She was not seen by members of the surgical team, anesthesia personnel, or the lunch-relief circulating nurse who had remained in the room and was charting. There had been no hand-off between the two circulating nurses, presumably since they had both stayed in the room. The missing kidney was discovered when the recovery surgeon looked up from the operative field, noticed the empty ice-machine, and asked as to the kidney's whereabouts. The discard was discovered within a short period of time, but 2 ^{1/2} hours had elapsed until the kidney could be recovered from the waste system, with warm ischemia the entire time. After extensive consultation amongst clinical leadership of the program and the family including the intended donor and recipient, the decision was made to discard the kidney. The recipient, having been anesthetized but not incised had been awakened and informed of the events.

The hospital and transplant program leadership took the following actions:

- 1. Voluntarily inactivates both the live-donor and cadaveric kidney transplant programs August 10.
- 2. Begins a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) August 10
- 3. Begins interviews in support of the RCA August 13
- 4. Reports events and inactivation to OPTN/UNOS promptly.

The University of Toledo Kidney Transplant Program Site Visit August 2012

- 5. Arranges for external review August 14
- 6. Reactivates the cadaveric kidney transplant program August 17, after consultation with OPTN/UNOS. The other transplant surgeons have by then returned to Toledo.
- 7. Undergoes site review by the Ohio Department of Health, on behalf of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
- 8. Modifies or implements new policies and procedures in the Operating Room Department:
 - a. Enhanced hand-off communication position to position
 - b. Room breakdown policy hard-wired
 - c. Implements a dedicated donor kidney container, with a sealed top
 - d. Implements a dedicated donor kidney tray, brightly colored and labeled
 - e. Conducts staff-wide education on events and policy changes
 - f. Case circulating nurse placed on paid administrative leave pending completion of the investigation
 - g. Lunch-relief circulating nurse placed on paid administrative leave pending completion of the investigation
 - h. Operating Room Administrative Director placed on paid administrative leave pending completion of the investigation
 - i. Transplant Program Directorship reassigned pending completion of the investigation
 - Formal communications on personnel changes and response to event with Operating Room Staff, Chiefs of Surgical Departments, Medical Executive Committee members, Board of Trustees
 - k. Employee assistance/counseling offered to Operating Room and transplant Team staff
 - I. Convened a task force to oversee implementation of the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) and regulatory response.

REVIEW PROCESS

Interviews were conducted in an administrative conference room of the University of Toledo Health Campus and a conference room in the Department of Urology at the University of Toledo Hospital with personnel listed below. The impression given was one of clear transparency to the events and processes and a genuine drive to program improvement. Additional records, documents, patient charts, and personnel were made available to us without hesitation. We were unequivocally instructed to take as much time as we needed, on this or any other subsequent visits, to be able to arrive at a sound impression of the events and program based upon our inquiry. At the end of the day an exit interview was conducted with senior leadership in which our preliminary conclusions were shared and questions answered.

One of us (MFL) has some familiarity with the transplant program, having made a previous detailed site visit in March of 2011 as part of an effort to improve clinical performance.

INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

The following University of Toledo Medical Center personnel were interviewed, one-on-one or in groups:

- Jeffrey P. Gold, M.D., Chancellor and Executive Vice President for Biosciences and Health Affairs, Dean of the College of Medicine and Life Sciences
- 2. Carl Sirio, M.D., Vice President for Medical Affairs/CMIO, Assoc. Dean for Clinical Affairs
- 3. Scott Scarborough, Ph.D., Senior Vice President and Executive Director/UTMC
- 4. Norma Tomlinson, Assoc. Vice President, Assoc. Executive Director/UTMC
- 5. Marge McFadden, Administrator/Hospital Development
- 6. Melissa Korb, Transplant Administrator
- 7. Michael Rees, M.D., Ph.D., Professor and Vice-Chair of Urology, Director of Renal Transplantation
- 8. Andrew Casabianca, M.D., Medical Director, Operating Room
- 9. Steven Selman, M.D., Chairman, Department of Urology
- 10. Gerald Zelenock, M.D., Chairman, Department of Surgery
- 11. Alan Marco, M.D., Chairman, Department of Anesthesiology
- 12. Tobin Klinger, Associate Vice-President, University Communications and Marketing
- 13. Vicki Huston, Operating Room Staff
- 14. Kim Munoz, Operating Room Staff

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were reviewed in detail:

- 1. Root Cause Analysis Draft Report
- 2. Policies and Procedures, Live-donor kidney transplantation
- 3. Operating Room policies and Procedures governing transplants
- 4. Representative Operating Room record, recent live-donor kidney transplant recipient
- 5. February 2012 OPTN/UNOS site visit report
- 6. March 2012 letter from OPTN/UNOS Membership and Professional Standards Committee Chair
- 7. OPTN/UNOS policy language re: key personnel change reporting requirement
- 8. CMS regulatory language re: key personnel change reporting requirement
- 9. Summary of transplant center actions taken in response to events
- 10. Transplant Quality/Assurance Process Improvement data and documents, calendar 2011
- 11. Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients data release July 12 2012 (<u>www.srtr.org</u>) for OHCO (University of Toledo Medical Center) accessed 1 September 2012.

SUMMARY OF VISIT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The OHCO program is a high-performing veteran program in existence for several decades, with seasoned and senior clinical and administrative leadership. In calendar 2011, 53 kidney transplants were performed (16 live-donor, 37 cadaveric). On 31 December 2011, 223 patients were on the kidney transplant waiting list. The program transplants at a higher than expected rate for cadaveric donors (O = 16.4, E = 10.9, statistically significant), indicating an aggressive clinical stance towards getting recipients transplanted. Survival statistics are robust, as indicated below:

	OBSERVED (%)	EXPECTED (%)
Deceased Donor (1 year) Graft Survival	96.3	92.04
Live Donor Graft Survival (1 year) Graft Survival	95.0	96.68
Patient Survival (1 year)	99.3	96.87

The OHCO program underwent a site visit by UNOS staff on behalf of the OPTN in February of 2012. The clinical score was 96 (passing threshold 90, the administrative score was 55 (passing threshold 90). The low administrative score was due to inaccurate/incomplete data on certain reporting forms, which have since been corrected. The program will undergo a desk audit (off site chart review) by UNOS staff 6 to 9 months from the most recent visit.

The program is under no regulatory sanction or non-routine review by either the OPTN or CMS, and is a member in good standing with the OPTN/UNOS.

Our review identified no systemic process or team culture which could have indicated the program was at risk of experiencing the noted discard. It does indeed seem to be an act of an experienced nurse who did not follow procedures or standard operating room behavior in her actions, and who was not able to explain her actions. We were not able to interview this nurse, as she had been placed on administrative leave. Her actions were indeed baffling. At several steps in the described events seemingly many opportunities would have arisen for her to question the unorthodox nature of the situation she had encountered (basin left in slush machine, usually indicative of the presence of the kidney; lap sponge left in the slush machine, also indicative of the presence of the kidney, presence of the transplanting surgeon still in the operating room of the donor, where he was completing the donor nephrectomy). We do note that she was not drug tested on the day of the event. We are also baffled that no other team member saw her dismantle the slush machine and remove the contents from the room.

None of our conversations/interviews could identify a pattern of behavior among team members which would predicate such a discard risk. We are not aware of any such similar discard previously reported by the transplant community. Yet we note that no hand-off was performed between the two circulating nurses, presumably because both were simultaneously in the room. We also note that the recovery surgeon sometimes takes the kidney to the recipient's room prior to completing the closure on the donor, sometimes leaves the kidney with him in the donor operating room, with no clear explanation as

to the circumstances that dictate one action or the other. We do think the enhanced communication steps and the added high-visibility donor kidney containers/trays detailed above are appropriate responses and will be helpful in preventing such situations in the future, as would eliminating any variability in *how* and *when* the donor kidney is handled/stored/transported to the recipient room, regardless of which surgeon is involved. We reviewed the draft report of the Root Cause Analysis in detail and are in general agreement with the findings and the recommended steps.

While we failed to identify a 'smoking gun' to explain this event, we do have some observations and recommendations that the OHCO leadership may wish to consider as they work to enhance the program:

- 1. Work towards more specialization of the nursing/technical staff in the Operating Room.

 Transplants is grouped with General Surgery and not a team onto its own. While the case volumes may preclude the creation and maintenance of a dedicated transplant team it would seem some higher degree of specialization is desired. We note that transplant proficiency is deemed to have been attained after a 6-month orientation/probationary period to the General Surgery there is no specific subsequent assessment of proficiency. We note that the nurse involved with this case was a part-time staff, and generally assigned to cystoscopy at that. With 16 live-donor cases a year and some 20 or so nurses on the General Surgery team who might be exposed to transplants it is very likely this nurse would see only one or two of these live donors in a year. With the easy access to sophisticated simulation modules at the University, it should be possible to assess regular (yearly?) competencies on specialized systems such as transplants.
- 2. Enhance transplant specific education in the operating room. We note that any on-going education related to transplants occurs on the Wednesday morning staff meeting. Late staff (11 to 11, for example) is to be educated on a Wednesday afternoon staff meeting, but this afternoon meeting is frequently cancelled due to work load. With the increasing scrutiny brought to bear on strict adherence to transplant regulations (ABO verification, UNOS ID verification, documentation of high risk donors, documentation of ECD donors, documentation of data verification after cross-clamp, for example) there is simply a zero tolerance policy on the part of the regulatory oversight, and transplant centers across the country must stay extremely vigilant and be current on all regulations. The administrative leadership of the Operating Room should ensure the educational structure is conducive to this vigilance.
- Maintain adequate staffing levels in the operating room. While we were unable to
 independently verify these impressions, our visit with OR staff led us to believe several positions
 were open and that work load amongst the OR staff was high and placing a high degree of stress
 of stress on the staff.
- 4. Strictly enforce hand-off procedures at the time of staff transition in and out of cases in the OR. We note that this is a key component of the Root Cause Analysis and a corrective action plan, but here again note that the OR staff we interviewed felt that hand-off communication was occasionally lax in the OR.

The University of Toledo Kidney Transplant Program Site Visit August 2012

- 5. Provide ongoing support to Transplant administration
 The Transplant Administrator of the program is relatively new to her position, having been promoted up from a long-standing transplant coordinator position. We note that she continues to have some clinical (occasional) responsibilities as a coordinator. The low administrative score on the recent OPTN/UNOS review is a reminder of the importance of expert and dedicated transplant administration. Availing herself of continuing education opportunities and networking through the OPTN/UNOS will be essential. Ongoing direct patient care by the administrator should be discouraged, as it will distract from the core mission of keeping the program functioning at a high level administratively and in good standing from a regulatory standpoint.
- 6. Re-address Transplant team staffing levels Staffing levels, particularly that of nurse coordinators (pre and post-transplants) was an area noted in need of more attention on our site visit in March of 2011. The ratio of patients followed to the number of coordinators continues to be significantly out of proportion to UNOS staffing benchmarks and creates an ongoing stressor to the clinical staff.